The work of geoscientists is generally addressed to solve practical problems, like for instance finding new hydrocarbon reservoirs or studying volcanoes. In these scientific fields, intuitions and qualitative analogies are equally important as the application of advanced technology and rigorous mathematical approaches. The thesis of this book is that the activity of geoscientists can also contribute to illuminate fundamental aspects and open questions of epistemology and cognition. How do geologists and geophysicists think, manage information, develop knowledge and communicate their ideas? What is a good model, a valid theory, a useful methodology? What is the meaning of ‘true’ and ‘false’ in their field of study? What is creativity? Is it a property of exceptional individual minds or a dialectic relationship between entire communities and their ecosystem? Or is it the combination of both? Is it possible to promote individual and team creativity? How? Can we find an aesthetic value in the daily work of geoscientists? All the above challenging questions are investigated in this book using a multidisciplinary approach. The discussion starts from the geosciences and continues with stimulating incursions in the field of ancient and modern philosophy, epistemology, cybernetics, Chaos theory, neurobiology, psychology and art. The objective is to highlight some unexplored links between cognition, philosophy of science and Earth disciplines, motivating the study and the application of all these fields observed from an unusual and inedited point of view. Despite the intrinsic complexity of the subject, this book is addressed to a large audience. This includes students, researchers, professionals and all those who are interested in exploring the cognitive and epistemological fundamentals of the Earth sciences. It can be useful also for managers leading creative teams, dealing with complex information, developing innovative products, services and ideas. Finally philosophers of science and cognitive scientists can find practical examples in this book related to important aspects of epistemology and human cognition.

Abstract Interpretation of images of the Earth's subsurface is a process whereby humans perceived and categorize visual features derived from seismic data. The seismic data are presented in the form of vertical slices showing points of change in some variable being measured (e.g. acoustic impedance) and horizontal slices showing surfaces interpolated between values at a particular time or horizon across multiple vertical slices. These images are usually highly complex and their nature has been determined largely by the technical capabilities of the hardware and software of the imaging technology. Because of these constraints, we argue, images do not convey information as readily as they could. We believe that these images could be more informative if they were constructed and tailored with known properties of the human visual system. Furthermore, little or no consideration has been given to the training and selection for image interpretation vis-à-vis the fundamental psychological skills that distinguish good from poor interpreters. In this paper we argue that tailoring images to the human visual system and developing working practices that eliminate biases will improve the detection of subtle features related to hydrocarbon traps. Furthermore, establishing training procedures that enhance the visual system's ability to detect and encode hydrocarbon traps, and creating selection procedures that select individuals with excellent visual imagery skills will also facilitate performance.

Abstract This chapter integrates concepts from cognitive science with disciplinary geoscience practice, to illustrate how different disciplines can collaborate on research and expand what is known in both fields. We consider the practice and goals of structural geology within an observation-prediction framework, adapted from the perception-action framework of Ulric Neisser. In this framework, the geologist has a conceptual model, about which she or he can reason about the world, and that forms the link between predictions and observations. The scientist engages in predictions based on a conceptual model and seeks out observations to confirm or revise this model. This approach is applied to how geoscientists engage in both geometric reasoning (in the subsurface; volumetric thinking) and kinematic reasoning. We then consider how the three principle types of structural geology analyses (geometric, kinematic, and dynamic) and empirical vs. theoretical approaches to solving problems interact with the observation-prediction framework. Finally, we outline how this observation-prediction cycle might be generalized to geoscience education and the practice of other sciences.

Few discoveries in geology are more important than geological time. However, for most people, it is impossible to grasp because of its massive scale. In this chapter, we offer a solution to this problem based on our research in cognition and education. Our strategy involves the decoupling of geological time between the macroscale of deep time, which includes the major features of Earth history, and the study of which we call event-based studies, and the microscale of relative time, represented by strata, the study of which we term logic-based studies. Our event-based study focuses on the problem of learning about macroevolution within the massive time scale of the fossil record. We approached this problem by creating a four-stage learning model in which the students manipulated a series of increasingly complex visual representations of evolution in time. Postprogram results indicate that students had a better understanding of macroevolution as seen in the fossil record; moreover, they appreciated that different events in absolute time required different scales of time to occur. Our logic-based studies used Montangero's diachronic thinking model as a basis for describing how students reconstruct geological systems in time. Using this model, we designed three specialized instruments to test a sample of middle and high school students. Our findings indicated that there were significant students in grade 9–12 and grade 7–8 in their ability to reconstruct geological systems. Moreover, grade 11–12 geology majors in Israel had a significant advantage over their nongeological counterparts in such reconstruction tasks.

Many students enrolled in geoscience courses have poorly developed spatial skills that may impede their success in mastering geoscience methods and concepts. To illustrate the variety of spatial skills required in the geosciences, we analyze a hypothetical field day of a structural geologist from the perspective of spatial cognition. We discuss some of the cognitive processes required for selective geoscience tasks, including map reading, navigation, perception of orientation, measurement of strike and dip, and interpretation of spatial diagrams including cross sections and stereographic projections. We suggest teaching strategies for several spatially demanding geologic tasks. We also outline ideas for future interdisciplinary research that may contribute to the development and evaluation of curricula designed to improve students' mastery of geoscience and spatial thinking, and, simultaneously, contribute to the field of cognitive science.

Learning geoscience and becoming a professional geoscientist require high-level spatial thinking. Thus, geoscience offers an intriguing context for studying people's mental representations and processes as they pertain to large-scale, three-dimensional spatial cognition and learning, from both cognitive science and geoscience perspectives. This paper discusses major tasks that professional geoscientists and geoscience learners deal with, focusing on the spatial nature of the tasks and underlying cognitive processes. The specific tasks include recognizing, describing, and classifying the shape of an object; describing the position and orientation of objects; making and using maps; envisioning processes in three dimensions; and using spatial-thinking strategies to think about nonspatial phenomena. Findings and implications from cognitive science literature that could be incorporated into geoscience teaching and some questions for future research are also discussed.

Geoscience visualizations are commonplace; they appear in television news programs, classroom lectures, conference presentations, and internet hypermedia. But to what degree do individuals who view such visualizations actually learn from them, and if so, why? As visualizations become more commonplace in school, laboratory, and entertainment settings, there has been a concurrent interest in considering the effectiveness of such presentations. How can we build effective collaborations that address pedagogical questions in the earth sciences while also informing theories about the cognitive processes that underlie visualization experiences? In this chapter, we contend that only through directed, collaborative projects between earth scientists and cognitive scientists will significant advances in visualization research take place. We describe two specific models of such collaboration, the advisory model and the reciprocal model, and argue that a reciprocal model presents a more effective framework for addressing important questions about the nature of visualization experiences. Such a model will inform both the design of effective visualizations for teaching complex geoscience topics, as well as provide insight into the processes that underlie learning from visualizations.

Expert geoscientists think in terms of systems that involve multiple processes with complex interactions. Earth system science has become increasingly important at the professional level, and an understanding of systems is a key learning goal at all levels of the earth science curriculum. In this paper, research in the cognitive and learning sciences is brought to bear on the question of how students learn systems thinking and on the challenges of developing effective instructional programs. The research suggests that learning systems concepts is difficult and that it involves extended learning progressions, requiring structured curricular integration across levels of K–16 instruction. Following a discussion of these challenges, current instructional innovations are outlined, and an agenda for needed research on learning and teaching systems thinking is proposed.

Interviews, paper-and-pencil (PNP) exercises, and class observations were the qualitative research methods used to investigate student alternate conceptions and their cognitive models of geoscience concepts. Three categories of geoscience concepts guided the research: rocks, density and convection, and water. A taxonomy of alternate conceptions is presented for the purpose of discussing the different ways that students conceptualize geoscience concepts, and examples of student-held alternate conceptions are listed herein. Coherent cognitive models about (1) rocks and their origins, (2) mantle dynamics, (3) the storage of groundwater in the subsurface and its connections to drinking water, and (4) the origin and movement of groundwater were generated from the data about alternate conceptions. This study also contains an evaluation of the three methods used in terms of their effectiveness at revealing student thinking, and different models for conceptualizing students' alternate conceptions are discussed. These include the discrete correct-incorrect model, the continuous unscientific-scientific model, the continuum model, the radial model, and the simplified web model. The findings of this research can be used to facilitate constructivist student-centered learning when they are taken into consideration and factored into (1) the practice of teaching, (2) course curriculum development, and (3) the development of formative and summative assessments that might include tests and in-class activities, respectively.

Abstract Opinion of geological experts is often formed despite a paucity of data and is usually based on prior experience. In such situations humans employ heuristics (rules of thumb) to aid analysis and interpretation of data. As a result, future judgements are bootstrapped from, and hence biased by, both the heuristics employed and prior opinion. This paper reviews the causes of bias and error inherent in prior information derived from the probabilistic judgements of people. Parallels are developed between the evolution of scientific opinion on one hand and the limits on rational behaviour on the other. We show that the combination of data paucity and commonly employed heuristics can lead to herding behaviour within groups of experts. Elicitation theory mitigates the effects of such behaviour, but a method to estimate reliable uncertainties on expert judgements remains elusive. We have also identified several key directions in which future research is likely to lead to methods that reduce such emergent group behaviour, thereby increasing the probability that the stock of common knowledge will converge in a stable manner towards facts about the Earth as it really is. These include: (1) measuring the frequency with which different heuristics tend to be employed by experts within the geosciences; (2) developing geoscience-specific methods to reduce biases originating from the use of such heuristics; (3) creating methods to detect scientific herding behaviour; and (4) researching how best to reconcile opinions from multiple experts in order to obtain the best probabilistic description of an unknown, objective reality (in cases where one exists).